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THE AFTEREFFECTS OF ANNULMENT: ALIMONY,
PROPERTY DIVISION, PROVISION FOR CHILDREN
When defects existing at the time of the marriage ceremony cause the
union to be invalid, annulment is the proper remedy.' At common law,
alimony, child support, and property division were denied following annul-
ment on the theory that no valid marriage ever existed.' The parties had
to determine for themselves a proper division of the real and personal prop-
erty accumulated during the marriage, with the result that the wife could
be left destitute. Children of an annulled marriage were illegitimate, and
the husband had no duty of support.'
In the vast majority of states today, annulment is infrequently used to
terminate marriage. In the few states where annulment is widely used, it
serves as a means of avoiding restrictive divorce laws.' Nevertheless, the
use of annulment in other states is not so infrequent as to be negligible."
1. At common law, civil disabilities such as prior marriage, idiocy and the like made
the marriage absolutely void, and no decree was necessary to establish its invalidity. The
canonical disabilities-consanguinity, affinity, and physical impotence-merely rendered
the marriage voidable. Until a decree could be obtained, the marriage was fully effective.
However, modem statutory confusion of the grounds for annulment has made the tradi-
tional void-voidable designations practically meaningless as a general distinction. C.
FoomB, R. LEVY & F. SANDER, CASES ON FAMILY LAW 174 (1966); Note, 17 IowA L.
Ray. 254 (1932).
2. Fessenden, Nullity ol Marriage, 13 HARv. L. REV. 110 (1899).
3. Id.
4. California and New York account for almost 73 per cent of all annulments in the
United States. C. FOOTE, R. LEvY & F. SANDER, supra note 1, at 177. The high inci-
dence of annulments is directly traceable to provisions in the divorce laws of the two
states. In California remarriage by either party is prohibited for a period of one year fol-
lowing the final divorce decree. CAL. CIV. CODE § 132 (Deering Supp. 1966). This in-
terlocutory provision does not apply to annulments. Until recently New York law made
adultery the only ground for divorce. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 1964).
Furthermore, the guilty party in a divorce action was prevented from remarrying during
the lifetime of the other spouse, unless court permission could be obtained. N.Y. Dom.
REL. LAW § 8 (McKinney 1964). However, in 1967 the New York legislature revised the
state's divorce law and provided five additional grounds for divorce: cruelty, abandon-
ment for two or more years, confinement in prison for three or more years, living apart
pursuant to a separation decree for two years, and impotency. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW §
170 (MeKinney Supp. 1966). Also under the new enactment parties to a divorce are
free to remarry without restriction. N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 8 (McKinney Supp. 1966).
This change will probably effect a significant reduction in the number of annulments in
New York. But see N.Y. Domt. REL. LAW §§ 215-215g (McKinney Supp. 1967) (com-
pulsory counseling in divorce).
5. For example, Missouri, a state not noted for a high annulment rate, granted 91
annulments in 1966. DEPARTMENT OF PUB. HEALTH AND WELFARE OF Mo., MISSOURI
VITAL STATISTICS 64 (Oct. 1967).
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The absence of statutory provision for alimony, child support, and property
division may create difficulties whenever the procedure is used, although
the problem is more aggravated where annulment is used to circumvent
divorce laws and the marital relationship of the parties is, therefore, more
likely to have been of greater duration. This note will examine the current
statutory and decisional reworking of the common law rule that the only
remedy available in an annulment action is a decree dissolving the marriage.
In addition, two alternatives for bringing order into this area of the law
will be discussed: (1) specific provision for courts to make alimony, child
support, and property division orders in annulment actions, or (2) elimina-
tion of the availability of annulment to avoid divorce when the latter offers
an adequate marital remedy.6
I. ALIMONY
A. Temporary Alimony
Temporary alimony is awarded to a wife while the matrimonial litiga-
tion is pending; permanent alimony is awarded at the conclusion of the
litigation. When the wife requests temporary alimony, she usually will also
request counsel and litigation fees.' Such temporary awards are designed
to afford the wife a temporary source of support pending the action and to
enable her to properly prosecute or defend the action.
Absent express statutory provision, courts in a majority of states award
temporary alimony and litigation fees when she enters a good faith defense
to an annulment action by her husband.' As a general rule, if there was
6. The possibility of subsequent modification of annulment decrees will not be dis-
cussed; nor will mention be made of such related matters as dower and curtesy or descent
and distribution following annulment.
7. 1 B. ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAw 295-300 (1953).
8. Peacock v. Peacock, 264 Ala. 332, 87 So. 2d 626 (1956); Ex Parte McLendon,
239 Ala. 564, 195 So. 733 (1940); Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286,
340 P.2d 331 (1959); Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 29 Colo. 295, 68 P. 237 (1902); DuPont v.
DuPont, 46 Del. 592, 87 A.2d 394 (1952); Alexander v. Alexander, 36 App. D.C. 78
(1910); Kienitz v. Kienitz, 38 Hawaii 647 (1950); State v. Superior Ct. of Madison
County, 242 Ind. 241, 177 N.E.2d 908 (1961); Webb v. Brooke, 144 Mich. 674, 108
N.W. 358 (1906); Muwinski v. Muwinski, 160 Minn. 477, 200 N.W. 465 (1924);
Aldridge v. Aldridge, 116 Miss. 385, 77 So. 150 (1918); Franklin v. Franklin, 365 Mo.
437, 283 S.W.2d 483 (1955); Kruse v. Kruse, 231 Mo. App. 1171, 85 S.W.2d 214
(1935); State ex. rel. Wooten v. District Ct., 57 Mont. 517, 189 P. 233 (1920); Tim-
merman v. Timmerman, 163 Neb. 704, 81 N.W.2d 135 (1957); Willits v. Willits, 76
Neb. 228, 107 N.W. 379 (1906); Fowler v. Fowler, 97 N.H. 216, 84 A.2d 836 (1951);
Prince v. Freeman, 45 N.M. 143, 112 P.2d 821 (1941); Barbee v. Barbee, 187 N.C. 537,
122 S.E. 177 (1924); Stone v. Stone, 193 Okla. 458, 145 P.2d 212 (1944); Whitebird v.
Luckey, 180 Okla. 1, 67 P.2d 775 (1937); Hunt v. Hunt, 23 Okla. 490, 100 P. 541
(1909); Stump v. Stump, 111 Pa. Super. 541, 170 A. 393 (1934); Baker v. Baker, 84
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a ceremonial marriage followed by assumption of the marital relationship,
no further proof of the marriage's validity is needed to sustain such an
award. The courts reason that where the marriage relationship has in fact
been assumed, and the wife reasonably establishes its existence, public pol-
icy demands provision of alimony.' However, if she fails to assert the valid-
ity of the marriage, her request will be denied, on the ground that no right
to alimony arises in the absence of a valid marriage."° If there are children,
several courts have awarded temporary alimony for the express purpose of
maintaining the children during the pendency of the annulment action.11
Such holdings ignore the primary basis for granting alimony-the husband's
obligation to support his wife as an incident of his marital responsibilities.
As a practical matter, however, this misconstruction of alimony's function
produces a satisfactory result if the funds are used for the designated pur-
pose of maintaining the children.12
Courts in several states deny temporary alimony and litigation fees in
annulment actions, 3 reasoning that they have no power to grant such
relief in the absence of express statutory authority. A Connecticut statute
gives the court discretion to grant permanent alimony in divorce and annul-
ment proceedings. 4 Another provision permits temporary alimony in di-
vorce actions." Connecticut courts have held that the latter section by
implication prohibits granting temporary alimony in annulment suits.",
This reasoning leads to the anomalous result of denying temporary alimony
Pa. Super. 544 (1925); Leckney v. Leckney, 26 R.I. 441, 59 A. 311 (1904); Scott v.
Scott, 9 S.D. 125, 68 N.W. 194 (1896); Portwood v. Portwood, 109 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1937); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944); Bell v. Bell,
122 W. Va. 223, 8 S.E.2d 183 (1940); Meredith v. Shakespeare, 97 W. Va. 514, 125
S.E. 374 (1924).
9. See Dietrich v. Dietrich, 41 Cal. 2d 497, 502, 261 P.2d 269, 771-72 (1953).
10. E.g., Peacock v. Peacock, 264 Ala. 332, 87 So. 2d 626 (1956); Middlecoff v.
Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959); Pry v. Pry, 225 Ind. 458, 75
N.E.2d 909 (1947); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944).
11. Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So. 2d 279 (1942); Taylor v. White, 160 N.C. 38,
75 S.E. 941 (1912).
12. In several states the matter of temporary alimony and litigation fees in annulment
proceedings has not been dealt with by statute or decision: Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Ken-
tucky, Nevada, North Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming.
13. Pascale v. Pascale, 5 Conn. Supp. 224 (Super. Ct. 1937); Arndt v. Arndt, 399
Ill. 490, 78 N.E.2d 272 (1948) (by implication); Monteleone v. O'Hanlon, 159 La.
796, 106 So. 308 (1925).
14. CONN. GaN. STAT. Rmv. § 46-28 (Supp. 1965).
15. CONN. GEN. STAT. Rav. § 46-21 (1958).
16. Hall v. Hall, 9 Conn. Supp. 1 (Super. Ct. 1940); Pascale v. Pascale, 5 Conn.
Supp. 224 (Super. Ct. 1937).
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when there is some doubt as to the validity of the marriage while permit-
ting permanent alimony when the marriage has been ruled invalid."
A number of states have statutes that expressly permit the court to award
temporary alimony and litigation fees in annulment proceedings."8 Con-
versely, no state has enacted legislation expressly prohibiting the award of
temporary allowances pending an annulment. A Virginia statute allowing
temporary alimony "at any time pending the suit"' 9 has been held appli-
cable to both annulment and divorce actions.2" Statutes that generally
authorize alimony upon annulment, such as that recently enacted in Wis-
consin, might also be construed as permitting temporary as well as perma-
nent alimony, although no cases have specifically so held.2 '
17. Illinois has not directly passed on the subject of temporary alimony but divorce
cases making mention of the subject indicate a general unwillingness to grant alimony
in any form "in the absence of a decree of divorce." E.g., Ollman v. OlIman, 396 Ill. 176,
184, 71 N.E.2d 50, 54 (1947). Therefore, it would appear that in the absence of a
valid marriage, the Illinois courts would not be likely to impose an alimony award on
the husband. The law in Louisiana, Maine, and Massachusetts is also unsettled concern-
ing alimony awards in annulment actions. The relevant decisions in Louisiana indicate
that alimony in any form will be denied in annulment actions. See State v. Ponthieaux,
232 La. 121, 94 So. 2d 3 (1957); Monteleone v. O'Hanlon, 159 La. 796, 106 So. 308
(1925). In Maine one case held that alimony could be granted only pursuant to a
divorce decree. Although this ruling effectively rules out the award of permanent ali-
mony in an annulment proceeding, it does not clarify the law concerning awards of tem-
porary alimony. Prescott v. Prescott, 59 Me. 146 (1871). As to the status of the Massa-
chusetts law on this subject, compare Adams v. Holt, 214 Mass. 77, 100 N.E. 1088
(1913), in which temporary alimony was denied, with Levy v. Levy, 309 Mass. 230, 34
N.E.2d 650 (1941), in which the court gave passing acknowledgement to the trial court's
discretion to grant temporary alimony in annulment actions.
18. ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.200 (1962); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (1967) (where
wife denies nullity); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1607 (1964); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAw §
236 (McKinney 1964); OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.14 (Page Supp. 1966); ORE.
REv. STAT. § 107.090 (1965); WASH. R.v. CODE ANN. § 26.08.090 (1961). There are
a number of decisions from these jurisdictions which either apply the statute or follow
the majority non-statutory rule without reference to the statute. See, e.g., Payne v.
Payne, 54 App. D.C. 149, 295 F. 970 (1924); Hanford v. Hanford, 214 Iowa 839,
240 N.W. 732 (1932); Ricard v. Ricard, 143 Iowa 182, 121 N.W. 525 (1909); Barnes
v. Barnes, 138 N.J. Eq. 504, 48 A.2d 890 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Wigder v. Wigder,
14 N.J. Misc. 880, 188 A. 235 (Ch. 1936); Butler v. Butler, 204 App. Div. 602, 198
N.Y.S. 391 (1923); Lukaiser v. Lukaiser, 89 N.Y.S.2d 671 (Sup. Ct. 1949); Bauman
v. Clark, 203 Ore. 193, 279 P.2d 478 (1955); Jones v. Jones, 48 Wash. 2d 862, 296
P.2d 1010 (1956); Arey v. Arey, 22 Wash. 261, 60 P. 724 (1900).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 20.103 (1950).
20. Henderson v. Henderson, 187 Va. 121, 46 S.E.2d 10 (1948). Although the tem-
porary alimony statute has been reenacted since the Henderson decision, the case is still
good law, because the nature of the statute's coverage and its general wording have not
been altered significantly.
21. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.245 (Supp. 1967). The presently existing statute in Wis-
consin dealing with temporary orders permits them in "every action affecting marriage."
WinS. STAT. ANN. § 247.23 (Supp. 1967).
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The most appropriate immediate solution to the various problems posed
by temporary alimony is a statute authorizing temporary allowances in
annulment actions whenever the woman has in good faith assumed the
position of wife. The wife has a right to such allowances, and the theoreti-
cal existence of a valid marriage should not affect this right. Nor should
the wife's position as plaintiff or defendant be controlling. Furthermore,
litigation costs should be expressly authorized for a woman who would not
otherwise be able properly to present her case. Although such results have
frequently been reached in the absence of express statutory authorization,
codification of specific guidelines would increase the likelihood of just and
consistent administration.
B. Permanent Alimony
The theoretical basis upon which permanent alimony is awarded in di-
vorce proceedings is far from clear. While it appears to be generally based
on a continuation of the husband's duty to support his wife,2" the influence
of the comparative fault of the parties for the breakdown of the marriage
is clear in the statutes, judicial opinions and the day-to-day administration
of the award.23 Moreover, there is some evidence that trial judges prefer
to make a clean break between the parties and will award alimony only
when "equitable" results cannot be achieved by a single lump sum settle-
ment and property division.2 One commentator has concluded that of all
support problems, it is in regard to alimony that "a new approach to the
rights and duties of the husband and wife is most needed."2 Nevertheless,
it seems likely that in a significant number of situations where the legal re-
lationship of husband and wife is terminated, alimony may serve a valid
function in adjusting the legal and economic relationships between the
parties.2"
22. See, e.g., In re Spencer, 83 Cal. 460, 23 P. 395 (1890); Commonwealth ex rel.
Brandt v. Brandt, 8 Lebanon 90, aff'd, 195 Pa. Super. 48, 169 A.2d 327 (1962).
23. In re Spencer, 83 Cal. 460, 23 P. 395 (1890); Daggett, Division of Property
Upon the Dissolution of Marriage, in SELECTED ESSAYS ON FAMILY LAW 1053, 1056
(American Assoc. of Law Schools ed. 1950).
24. Hopson, The Economics of Divorce: A Pilot Empirical Study at the Trial Court
Level, 11 KAN. L. REv. 107, 125-26 (1962).
25. Note, A Consideration of Husband's Duty to Support and Wife's Duty to Render
Services, 29 VA. L. Rv. 857, 865 (1943).
26. The theory of quantum meruit has been applied on occasion to determine the
extent of an alimony award and as a vehicle for granting monetary awards in lieu of
property settlement. Middlecoff v. Middlecoff, 160 Cal. 2d 22, 324 P.2d 669 (1958);
Overton v. Brown, 3 La. App. 591 (1926); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss. 746,
52 So. 2d 624 (1951); Walker v. Walker, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 84 N.E.2d 258 (C.P.
Lake County 1948). Under this doctrine the wife is entitled to recover compensation for
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In the absence of an express statutory provision, most courts have not
allowed permanent alimony following an annulment." The courts reason
that since an annulment decree finds that no valid marriage ever existed,
the alleged husband owes no duty of maintenance or support to his appar-
ent wife."
Several states have enacted statutes expressly giving courts discretion to
award permanent alimony in annulment suits when such an allowance
would be just and equitable5 A Connecticut statute, for example, allows
services rendered during the marital relationship when her actions have been in good
faith. Sanquinetti v. Sanquinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Barber v. Barber,
74 Iowa 301 (1887). Massachusetts, however, has denied a wife compensation in an
annulment proceeding for services rendered. The court reasoned that a money award is
similar to alimony and absent statutory authority the court has no discretion to make
such an award. Adams v. Holt, 214 Mass. 77, 100 N.E. 1088 (1913). See also Baker v.
Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 23 N.W.2d 582 (1946).
27. See, e.g., Peacock v. Peacock, 264 Ala. 332, 87 So. 2d 626 (1956); Goggans v.
Osborn, 16 Alas. 451, 237 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1956) (by implication in a contempt
action); Sanquinetti v. Sanquinetti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937); Middlecoff v.
Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959); DuPont v. DuPont, 46 Del.
592, 87 A,2d 394 (1952); Payne v. Payne, 54 App. D.C. 149, 295 F. 970 (1924);
Alexander v. Alexander, 36 App. D.C. 78 (1910); Kienitz v. Kienitz, 38 Hawaii 647
(1950), Morgan v. Morgan, 148 Ga. 625, 97 S.E. 675 (1918); Schlamberg v. Schlam-
berg, 220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 P. 127
(1898); Rose v. Rose, 274 Ky. 208, 118 S.W.2d 529 (1938); Monteleone v. O'Hanlon,
159 La. 796, 106 So. 308 (1925); Chase v. Chase, 55 Me. 21 (1867); Yake v. Yake,
170 Md. 75, 183 A. 555 (1936); Adams v. Holt, 214 Mass. 77, 100 N.E. 1088 (1913);
Aldridge v. Aldridge, 116 Miss. 385, 77 So. 150 (1918); Kruse v. Kruse, 231 Mo. App.
1171, 85 S.W.2d 214 (1935); McMurray v. McMurray, 58 Mont. 229, 190 P. 924 (1920);
Willits v. Willits, 76 Neb. 228, 107 N.W. 379 (1906); Widger v. Widger, 14 N.J. Misc.
880, 188 A. 235 (App. Div. 1936); Prince v. Freeman, 45 N.M. 143, 112, P.2d 821
(1941); Short v. Short, 61 Ohio L. Abs. 49, 102 N.E.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1951); White-
bird v. Luckey, 180 Okla. 1, 67 P.2d 775 (1937); Chapman v. Parsons, 66 W. Va. 307,
66 S.E. 461 (1909) (by implication in an action for alimony pendente lite); Becker v.
Becker, 153 Wis. 226, 140 N.W. 1082 (1913); cf., e.g., Olman v. Ollman, 396 11. 176,
71 N.E.2d 50 (1947) (by implication in a divorce case); Strater v. Strater, 159 Me.
508, 196 A.2d 94 (1963) (by implication in a divorce case); State ex rel. Wooten v.
District Ct, 57 Mont., 517, 189 P. 233 (1920) (by implication in an application for
alimony pendente lite); Abelt v. Zeman, 16 Ohio Op. 2d 87, 173 N.E.2d 907 (C.P.
Wayne County 1961). But see Bray v. Landergren, 161 Va. 699, 172 S.E. 252 (1934),
finding a continuing obligation to support but rejecting the specific division of property
inherent in the theory of quantum meruit. See also Jones v. Jones, 48 Wash. 2d 862,
296 P.2d 1010 (1956), in accord with the statement in the text, but finding statutory
authorization to make the award.
28. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
29. ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.210 (1962) (divorce and actions declaring a marriage void);
CONN. GEN. STAT. Rav. § 46-28 (Supp. 1965); IowA CODE ANN. § 598.24 (1946)
(when wife acted in good faith); N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1955); N.Y. Doms.
REL. LAW § 236 (McKinney 1964); ORE. Rav. STAT. § 107.100 (1965); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.245 (Supp. 1967) (in special
circumstances).
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the court to make such orders concerning permanent alimony "as it might
make in a proceeding for a divorce between such parties if married."3
Similarly, a Virginia statute allows permanent alimony on "dissolution of
a marriage, and also upon... divorce."' 1 The wording of this last statute
indicates that "dissolution of marriage" refers not only to divorce, but in-
cludes annulment.
Statutes in three states authorize permanent alimony incident to an an-
nulment only in limited situations. In Iowa, either party can receive per-
manent alimony only if he entered into the marriage in good faith. 2 The
Hawaiian courts are given discretion to grant the wife and children a
support allowance when the husband in bad faith induced the marriage."
Although the statute describes this award as a "allowance for the support,"
it serves the same purpose as an alimony decree. The innocent spouse in
Wisconsin may receive permanent alimony in three situations: when the
husband fails to reveal that he is not divorced from his former wife; when
he fails to wait the one-year statutory period following divorce; or when he
fails to obtain the necessary permission of the court to remarry.'
Permanent alimony statutes of a few states, not limited by their express
terms to divorce proceedings, arguably apply to annulment proceedings.
In Tennessee 5 and New Mexico 6 an award of permanent alimony may
be made upon "dissolution of marriage." A Virginia case construed the
language "dissolution of marriage" as including annulments as well as di-
vorce.' New Mexico rejected the Virginia construction and has followed
the common law by denying permanent alimony in annulment. 8 While
there are no cases in Tennessee allowing permanent alimony, neither are
there any specifically negating the authority to make such an award.'
30. CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 46-28 (Supp. 1965).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107 (Supp. 1966).
32. IowA CODE ANN. § 598.24 (1946).
33. HAWAI REV. LAWS § 324-4 (1955). Such allowance cannot exceed one-third of
the husband's estate.
34. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.245 (Supp. 1967).
35. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-820 (1955). This section permits the allowance of ali-
mony when a marriage is "dissolved absolutely," but there are no cases interpreting its
application to annulments.
36. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6 (1953). Allowance of permanent alimony is sanc-
tioned in "any suit for dissolution of the bonds of matrimony."
37. See notes 19-20 supra and accompanying text.
38. Prince v. Freeman, 45 N.M. 143, 112 P.2d 821 (1941).
39. See Fessenden, supra note 2, at 112. Although the Kansas statute dealing with
permanent alimony does not expressly include annulments, it is arguable that it confers
the power to make such awards in annulment actions. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610
(1964). In New Jersey, a statutory provision has been construed to permit the award of
temporary alimony in annulment actions, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (1952), but it is
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Only Ohio prohibits by statute the award of permanent alimony in an-
nulment actions." Such legislation in effect codifies the common law rule
and avoids any ambiguity in the meaning of related code provisions deal-
ing with termination of marriage."
In drafting an alimony statute, it must be recog-nized that the theoretical
basis for alimony is confused. The solution most often used by the courts
in dealing with alimony awards in annulment proceedings consists of exer-
cising the statutory authority to award alimony that is applicable to divorce.
Although this approach is preferable to denying courts any authority to
award alimony in annulment proceedings, it probably transfers to annul-
ment the problems of existing divorce-alimony administration. The expan-
sion of authority to award alimony in annulment proceedings provides an
opportunity to reconsider the part which alimony should play in the ad-
ministration of marital dissolution. Some commentators have suggested
basing the award solely upon the need of the more economically deficient
spouse,42 but where the marriage has been of short duration it is difficult
to justify imposing upon the husband the burden of supporting even an
obviously needy ex-wife. A more satisfactory approach would direct that
alimony be used to require one spouse to support the other when, by rea-
son of living together as man and wife, the wife's ability to maintain her-
self has been reduced, as when she is unlikely to remarry because the dura-
tion of the marital relationship has taken her past her period of "prime
eligibility." Fault, under such a formulation, would no longer be consid-
ered, and the general criteria would be appropriately applied whether the
marital relationship was terminated by divorce or annulment.43
unlikely that this provision also encompasses permanent alimony. Dicta in a recent case
dealing with a related matter indicates that there is no right to alimony in the case of a
void marage. Minder v. Minder, 83 N.J. Super. 159, 199 A.2d 69 (Ch. 1964); see
Barnes v. Barnes, 138 N.J. Eq. 504, 48 A.2d 890 (1946). In Kansas cases decided prior
to the present statute's enactment denied permanent alimony in annulment proceedings.
Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 P. 127 (1898); Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Kan. 582, 7 P.
241 (1885). However, these cases are dated, and the current statute indicates a different
result.
40. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.17 (Page 1960).
41. See KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1964); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 754
(1959), VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107 (Supp. 1966).
42. See S. HOFSTADTER & S. LEVITTAN, ALIMONY-A REFORMULATION OF FAMILY
LAw 51 (1967).
43. It seems likely that in most annulment situations, where the marriage will have
been of short duration, no damage to either party's ability to provide support will have
occurred. But it is possible to hypothesize situations where alimony would, under such
circumstances, be proper-as where the woman has become pregnant, thus, drastically
affecting her ability to pursue a full-time career.
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II. DIVISION OF PROPERTY
Authority of courts to transfer separately-owned property of either spouse
to the other upon decree of divorce is purely statutory; in the absence of
express statutory authorization there exists no power to deal with the prop-
erty rights of the spouses.4 Generally, however, the courts may divide
community or jointly acquired property in kind, and will do so whenever
possible. 5 In the alternative, a court may enter a money judgment in lieu
of property division" or may set aside all of the property to one party and
require such party to pay a specified amount of money to the other spouse."
Although annulment usually terminates marriages shortly after the cere-
mony, consideration must occasionally be given to distribution of property. 8
In theory an annulment decree places the parties in the same position as
if the marriage never existed. While a few courts, applying this logic, have
refused to divide property accumulated during the marriage, " leaving the
parties to determine for themselves how the property will be divided, a
majority of courts will effect some equitable distribution."0
44. E.g., Adair v. Adair, 258 Ala. 293, 303, 62 So. 2d 437, 446 (1952); Menor v.
Menor, 154 Colo. 475, 391 P.2d 473 (1964); Kulok v. Kulok, 40 Misc. 2d 999, 244
N.Y.S.2d 521 (Dist. Ct. 1963).
45. E.g., Wood v. Wood, 263 Ala. 384, 82 So. 2d 556 (1955); Snyder v. Snyder, 205
N.E.2d 159 (Ind. App. 1965); Hearns v. Hearns, 333 Mich. 423, 53 N.W.2d 315
(1952).
46. Lain v. Lain, 134 Ind. App. 557, 189 N.E.2d 838 (1963); Esseltyn v. Casteel,
205 Ore. 344, 288 P.2d 215 (1955).
47. Dallman v. Dallman, 164 Cal. App. 2d 815, 331 P.2d 245 (1958); Poage v.
Poage, 59 N.M. 17, 278 P.2d 132 (1954); Esseltyn v. Casteel, 205 Ore. 344, 288 P.2d
215 (1955).
48. See Fung Dai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1928);
Whitebird v. Luckey, 180 Okla. 1, 67 P.2d 775 (1937).
49. The cases holding that a wife is not entitled to a share in property accumulated
during the supposed marriage are both rare and dated. One Georgia case has held that
following the annulment of a marriage entered in good faith, the wife acquired no
rights in the joint accumulation of the parties while they lived together. Schmitt v.
Schneider, 109 Ga. 628, 35 S.E. 145 (1900). Although the justification for this ruling
is doubtful, the ruling has never been overturned either by case or statute. Accord,
Bruno v. Bruno, 221 Ark. 759, 256 S.W.2d 341 (1953); Cooper v. McCoy, 116 Ark.
501, 173 S.W. 412 (1915). But see Vance v. Hinch, 222 Ark. 494, 261 S.W.2d 412
(1953); Note, The Effect of Void and Voidable Marriages in Arkansas, 10 ARi. L. Rav.
188 (1956).
50. Fung Dai Kim Ah Leong v. Lau Ah Leong, 27 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1928); Mid-
dlecoff v. Middlecoff, 171 Cal. App. 2d 286, 340 P.2d 331 (1959); Arthur v. Arthur,
152 Cal. App. 2d 87, 312 P.2d 762 (1957) (household furniture and equipment);
Rickards v. Rickards, 53 Del. 134, 166 A.2d 425 (1960); Schlamberg v. Schlamberg,
220 Ind. 209, 41 N.E.2d 801 (1942); Reese v. Reese, 132 Kan. 438, 295 P. 690 (1931);
Werner v. Werner, 59 Kan. 399, 53 P. 127 (1898); Fuller v. Fuller, 33 Kan. 582, 7 P.
241 (1885); Prieto v. Succession of Prieto, 165 La. 710, 115 So. 911 (1928); Overton
v. Brown, 3 La. App. 591 (1926) (community property); Donnelly v. Donnelly, 84
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Some courts treat the property as held in joint tenancy or in tenancy in
common, and order an equal division.5' This method is based on the theory
that there has been an unsuccessful attempt to create a tenancy by the en-
tirety. While this system is preferable to the common law refusal to dis-
tribute property, it can result in obvious unfairness. A party may purchase
a large amount of property solely with his own money following the mar-
riage ceremony, only to find the property will be divided equally upon
annulment, without regard to the original investment. Since there is no
definite standard governing when the joint tenancy-tenancy in common
device should be applied, there is no concrete protection against an inequi-
table determination.
At least two community property states, Louisiana and California, have
permitted the wife to acquire an interest in the community property by
application of the putative spouse doctrine. This doctrine asserts that a
woman who lives with a man as his wife in the good faith belief that a valid
marriage exists is entitled upon termination of their relationship to share in
the property acquired by them during its existence."2 California has held
that upon dissolution of a "putative marriage the property ...is to be
treated as though it was the accumulation of a valid marriage." 3
A.2d 89 (Md. Ct. App. 1951) (tenancy in common): Walker v. Walker, 330 Mich. 332,
47 N.W.2d 633 (1951); Chrismond v. Chrismond, 211 Miss. 746, 52 So. 2d 624 (1951);
Lawrence v. Heavner, 232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950) (tenancy in common);
Walker v. Walker, 54 Ohio L. Abs. 153, 84 N.E.2d 258 (C.P. Lake County 1948);
Whitebird v. Luckey, 180 Okla. 1, 67 P.2d 775 (1937); Krauter v. Krauter, 79 Okla. 30,
190 P. 1088 (1920); Juliano v. Juliano, 24 Pa. D. & C. 585 (C.P. Phila. County 1935)
(tenancy in common); Beuck v. Howe, 71 S.D. 288, 23 N.W.2d 744 (1946); Jenkins v.
Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944); Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345,
196 P.2d 835 (1948) (not community property); Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213,
96 P. 1079 (1908); Philips v. Philips, 106 W. Va. 105, 144 S.E. 875 (1928); Siskoy v.
Siskoy, 250 Wis. 435, 27 N.W.2d 488 (1947).
In several states the matter of property division in annulment proceedings has not
been considered by the courts or legislatures. The states are Alabama, Arizona, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Maine, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Wyoming.
51. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 84 A.2d 89 (Md. Ct. App. 1951); Lawrence v. Heaver,
232 N.C. 557, 61 S.E.2d 697 (1950); Juliano v. Juliano, 24 Pa. D. & C. 585 (C.P.
Phila. County 1935). But see Rickards v. Rickards, 53 Del. 134, 166 A.2d 425 (1960).
52. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon, 116 Cal. App. 2d 681, 689, 254 P.2d 644,
649 (1953) (dissolution by death); Overton v. Brown, 3 La. App. 591 (1926); Rochelle
v. Hezeau, 15 La. Ann. 306 (1860).
53. Union Bank & Trust Co. v. Gordon, 116 Cal. App. 2d 681, 689, 254 P.2d 644,
649 (1953) (dissolution by death). In several states the theory of quantum meruit has
been applied in order to make a monetary award in lieu of property division. The
quantum meruit device is used to avoid unfairness in annulment proceedings and is in
effect used as substitute for unavailable alimony as well as for division of property. See
note 26 supra.
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A substantial number of states do have statutes authorizing property
division in annulment actions. Several provide for division of property in
conjunction with the granting of alimony." A Washington statute permits
the court to make a disposition of the property that is equitable, to pro-
vide for the custody and support of children, and to grant alimony to the
wife.
5 5
Three jurisdictions distinguish between real and personal property. In
Michigan the wife receives that portion of the real property to which she
would be entitled if her husband died intestate,50 while the whole or such
part of the personal property is awarded as the court "shall deem just and
reasonable."5 " Minnesota allows the wife immediate possession of all her
real estate' and restoration of what is just and reasonable from her hus-
band's personal estate. 9 Nebraska distributes real property on the same
basis as Michigan,6" and grants the wife all the personal property or such
reasonable part as the husband received by means of the apparent mar-
riage.61
Although courts achieve generally satisfactory results in dividing prop-
erty upon annulment, a statute expressly granting discretion to distribute
both jointly acquired and separate property would promote consistency
and fairness. The statute should include definite guide-lines adopting the
best of the considerations employed in divorce cases. For example, the
length of the marriage is significant to any property division. If the mar-
riage lasted a number of years, more should go to the dependent spouse
than would be the case when the marriage is of short duration. Who paid
for the property in question is also relevant. If an item was obtained solely
through the individual resources of one spouse, there is strong justification
for awarding the property to that party. Another relevant factor is the type
of property involved. The wife and children are more likely to need the
54. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:19 (1955); ORE. RvV. STAT. § 107.100 (1965);
VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107 (Supp. 1966); WAsH. REV. CODI: ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961).
It is notable that New Hampshire is the only state that expressly allows the putative
husband to recover any allowance in an annulment based on the wife's misfeasance.
The husband is allowed such part of the wife's estate as "justice may require." See
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 458:22 (1955).
55. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961).
56. MicH. STAT. ANN. § 25.98 (1957).
57. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.99 (1957.)
58. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (Supp. 1967).
59. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.59 (Supp. 1967).
60. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-313 (1960).
61. NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-314 (1960). The District of Columbia specifically pro-
vides for determination of property rights by the court in both divorce and annulment.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-910 (1966). See also IDAuo CODE ANN. § 32-712 (Supp. 1967)
(allows property division following dissolution of marriage).
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security of retaining the family home and personal effects such as furniture
and clothing. In contrast, the court should consider awarding any family
business to the husband, particularly if he will need a source of income to
make support payments. Finally, the relative financial position of the parties
must be considered: the award should not be so low as to make the wife
become a ward of the state; nor should the distribution be so favorable to
the wife as to prevent the husband from meeting other obligations imposed
by the court (i.e., alimony and child support). Through careful applica-
tion of these criteria, the court's decision should be both just and reason-
able for all concerned.
III. LEGITIMACY, CUSTODY AND CHILD SUPPORT
At common law the children of an annulled marriage were considered
illegitimate.'4 To avoid this harsh result, a large number of states have
passed statutes making children of an annulled marriage legitimate.0-
Others have distinguished between marriages that are void ab initio, and
those merely voidable by court decree,"4 holding the offspring of the latter
only to be legitimate."
62. At common law an illegitimate child was not entitled to inherit from his parents,
and the parents were free of any obligation to support the child. Reader, The Annul-
ment of Marriage in Pennsylvania, 41 DICK L. REV. 37 (1936).
63 CAL. CIV. CODE 84 (Deering 1960); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-5 (1963);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-28 (Supp. 1965); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 105 (1953);
HAWAII REV. LAWS § 324-5 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-503 (1963) (unless de-
frauded as to wife's pregnancy); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 23-124 (1964); Ky. REV.
STAT, ANN. § 391.100 (1963); AID. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 27 (1966); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 474.080 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 48-207 (Supp. 1967); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 125-410 (1967); N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:23 (1955) (unless court decrees
otherwise); NM. STAT. ANN. § 57-1-9 (1953); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 175 (Mc-
Kinney 1964); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11.1 (1966); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-04-03
(1960); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.33 (Page Supp. 1966); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
84, § 215 (1951); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 169.1 (1965); S.D. CODE § 14.031 (1939);
TE.NN. CODE ANN. § 36-832 (1955); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 520 (1959); VA. CODE
ANN,. § 64.7 (1949); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.060 (1961).
64. At common law the rights of the parties to an annullable marriage were de-
pendent upon whether the marriage was absolutely void when entered into or merely
voidable through court decree. In theory, a void marriage was always void and there
need be no judicial cognizance of the fact. In order to invalidate a voidable marriage,
however, direct judicial attack by the innocent party was required. While a void marriage
could never become valid, a voidable marriage could be given effect by ratification.
Although certain vestiges of this distinction still exist, as indicated in the text, dis-
solution of marriage by annulment is now generally conceded to require some degree
of judicial formality. See R. MACKAY, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE SIMPLIFIED
7-8 (3d ed. 1959); Fessenden, Nullity of Marriage, 13 HARv. L. REV. 110, 112-13
(1899), Reader, supra note 62.
Georgia and North Carolina have statutes that prohibit annulment when children
are born or will be born of the apparent marriage. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-601 (1933);
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A large majority of states now have statutes that give the courts express
authority to make orders concerning child custody and support following
an annulment.6 However, in the absence of statutory authorization, a num-
ber of courts have assumed the right to grant custody and support decrees
on the basis of their inherent equity powers."7 Courts in several states have
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-3 (1966); see Wallace v. Wallace, 221 Ga. 510, 145 S.E.2d 546
(1965); Scarboro v. Morgan, 233 N.C. 449, 64 S.E.2d 422 (1951). In New Jersey a
similar statute has been held to grant the courts discretion to deny annulment if it
would be adverse to the child's best interests. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-1 (1952);
Caruso v. Caruso, 104 N.J. Eq. 588, 146 A. 649 (1929). These statutes protect the
children from illegitimacy and its related disabilities. However, the void-voidable dis-
tinction is again present since these states have by statute rendered children of void
marriages legitimate with the corresponding implication that a support obligation arises
in such cases. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-104 (1933); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-20 (1952).
This indicates a recognition of the common law rule that void marriages do not require
a judicial decree in order to be terminated. See Note, 17 IowA L. REv. 254 (1932).
65. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-907 to -908 (1966) (legitimate in case of bigamy, idiocy,
and insanity); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 598.22-.23 (1946) (illegitimate in case of con-
sanguinity or husband's impotence); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 391-100 (1963) (illegiti-
mate in cases of miscegenation or incest); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §a 633-34
(1964) (illegitimate only in case of consanguinity); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 207, §§
15-17 (1955) (illegitimate only in case of consanguinity); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§ 25.6,
25.108-.109 (1957) (illegitimate only in case of bigamy); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2748-03
(Supp. 1966) (illegitimate in case of consanguinity or miscegenation); NED. REv. STAT.
§§ 42-326 to -328 (1960) (illegitimate in case of miscegenation or consanguinity);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-68 to -70 (1957) (illegitimate in case of consanguinity).
Statutes making children of a bigamous marriage legitimate generally contain a good
faith requirement. Rendering the child illegitimate when the parties to a bigamous
marriage both act in bad faith seems a somewhat unfair result inasmuch as the innocent
child is the only one to directly suffer from such a rule.
A number of other states have statutes which provide only a partial solution to the
problem of legitimacy. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.051 (Supp. 1968) (children of bigamous
marriage are illegitimate); GA. CODE ANN. § 53-104 (1933) (children of a void mar-
riage legitimate); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-1-6 (1956) (court has power to declare
legitimacy); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-6.1 (1962) (legitimate in case of good faith bigamous
marriage); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-3 (1953) (legitimate in case of good faith biga-
mous marriage).
66. ALASKA STAT. § 9.55.210 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 84 (Deering 1960); COLO.
Rxv. STAT. ANN. § 46-3-6 (1963); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 46-28 (Supp. 1965); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1510 (1953); HAWAI REv. LAWS § 324-31 (1955); IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 32-504 (1963); ME. Rnv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752 (1964); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 207, § 18 (1955); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 25.96 (1957); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17
(1947); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2748-04 (Supp. 1966); MONT. Rxv. CODES ANN. §
48-207 (Supp. 1967); NEB. REv. STAT. § 42-311 (1960); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
458:17 (1955); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1964); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN.
§ 14-04-04 (1960); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.33 (Page Supp. 1966); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1277 (1961); ORE. Rev. STAT. § 107.100 (1965); S.D. CODE § 14.0604
(1939); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-828 (1955); VA. CODE ANN. § 20.107 (Supp. 1966);
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (1961); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-2-15 (1966);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.24 (1957); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-61 (1957).
67. See, e.g., Rowe v. Rowe, 96 F. Supp. 334 (D.D.C. 1951); Kibler v. Kibler,
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assumed the power to make such awards by reference to statutory provi-
sions not directly covering annulments. In California, a general statute
providing for custody and maintenance of children has been held appli-
cable to annulments although it contains no specific reference." California
decisions indicate that even if the power to make custody and support or-
ders following an annulment cannot be inferred from the statute, the right
to make such orders is inherent in any court having jurisdiction over annul-
ments. 9 The Utah Supreme Court has held that the statute which makes
children of a void marriage legitimate, also, by implication, confers juris-
diction on the court to make custody and support orders."'
180 Ark. 1152, 24 S.W.2d 867 (1930); Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So. 2d 279
(1942); Wallace v. Wallace, 221 Ga. 510, 145 S.E.2d 546 (1965); Cardenas v.
Cardenas, 12 I1. App. 2d 497, 140 N.E.2d 377 (1956); Pry v. Pry, 225 Ind. 458, 75
N.E.2d 909 (1947) (implicit in legitimation statute); Clayton v. Clayton, 231 Md. 74,
188 A.2d 550 (1962); Carroll v. DeMartini, 19 N.J. Super. 136, 88 A.2d 26 (1952);
Sanders v. Sanders, 232 S.C. 625, 103 S.E.2d 281 (1958); Home of the Holy Infancy
v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d
262 (1944). There are also a number of cases dealing with this matter to be found
in the statutory jurisdictions already enumerated. See Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d
659, 166 P.2d 268 (1946); Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 339 (1931); Arthur
v. Authur, 152 Cal. App. 2d 87, 312 P.2d 762 (1957); Williams v. Williams, 102 Cal.
App. 2d 206, 227 P.2d 43 (1951); Perlstein v. Perlstein, 152 Conn. 152, 204 A.2d
909 (1964); Bass v. Ervin, 177 Miss. 46, 170 So. 673 (1936); Paltani v. Creel, 169
Neb. 591, 100 N.W.2d 736 (1960); Harder v. Harder, 162 Neb. 433, 76 N.W.2d 260
(1956); Bickford v. Bickford, 74 N.H. 448, 69 A. 579 (1908); Caldwell v. Caldwell,
298 N.Y. 146, 81 N.E.2d 60 (1948); Radeff v. Radeff, 272 App. Div. 582, 74 N.Y.S.2d
749 (1947); Heusner v. Heusner, 181 Misc. 1015, 42 N.Y.S.2d 850 (1943); Abelt v.
Zeman, 16 Ohio Op. 2d 87, 173 N.E.2d 907 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1961); Green-
wood v. Greenwood, 387 P.2d 615 (Okla. 1963); Stone v. Stone, 193 Okla. 458, 145
P.2d 212 (1944); Hunt v. Hunt, 23 Okla. 490, 100 P. 541 (1909); State ex rel.
Weingart v. Kiessenbeck, 167 Ore. 25, 114 P.2d 147 (1941); Henderson v. Henderson,
187 Va. 121, 46 S.E.2d 10 (1948); Jones v. Jones, 48 Wash. 2d 862, 296 P.2d 1010
(1956); Barker v. Barker, 31 Wash. 2d 506, 197 P.2d 439 (1948); Siskoy v. Siskoy,
250 Wis. 435, 27 N.W.2d 488 (1947); Watts v. Owens, 62 Wis. 512, 22 N.W. 720
(1885).
68. CAL. CiV. CODE § 84 (Deering 1960); see Swycaffer v. Swycaffer, 44 Cal. 2d
689, 285 P.2d 1 (1955); Williams v. Williams, 102 Cal. App. 2d 206, 227 P.2d 43
(1951).
69. See, e.g., Munson v. Munson, 27 Cal. 2d 659, 166 P.2d 268 (1946); Arthur v.
Arthur, 152 Cal. App. 2d 87, 312 P.2d 762 (1957).
70. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 107 Utah 239, 153 P.2d 262 (1944). In Kansas, a statute
provides that a decree for child custody and support may be made "in an action under
this article." KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 60-610 (1964). Since the "article" covers
both annulment and divorce, the law would seem to be clear, despite an absence of
cases applying the provision in annulment actions. Although there is no specific statute
allowing for custody and support of children following an annulment in Vermont, one
section of the code provides that custody and maintenance of children of a marriage
annulled on the ground of fraud go to the innocent party. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 517 (1959).
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States that do not specifically protect children of an invalid marriage
generally provide by statute that parents of illegitimate children are bound
to support and maintain them." Even in the absence of a statute, it is
generally accepted that the father of an illegitimate child owes him a duty
of support. 2 In some states this obligation has been held to be implicit
in the relevant statutory provision."' In Texas, for example, there is no
common law duty for a father to maintain his illegitimate children. How-
ever, a Texas court has held that it is implicit in a statute which legitima-
tizes children of certain void marriages, that the court may award custody
and impose a duty of support on the parents. 4
It is clear that there is no longer, if indeed there ever was, any justifica-
tion for imposing the burden of illegitimacy on children of annulled mar-
riages. Statutory provision should be made for the legitimacy of all such
children. Further, the court should have authority to determine custody
and order support in the same manner as a divorce proceeding.
CONCLUSION
In most jurisdictions where legislative or judicial attention has been
given to the authority of the annulment court to deal with the rights of
the parties, the result has been an improvisation of authority molded on
existing divorce procedures. An approach that has received more limited
acceptance is the elimination of annulment as a procedure for termination
of marriage. In Rhode Island divorce may be granted for either a void or
voidable marriage,"5 while in Maryland divorce may be granted for mar-
riages deemed void."6 A number of other states have made certain com-
mon law grounds for annulment grounds for divorce as well." For ex-
71. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 196a, 200 (Deering Supp. 1967); MAss. ANN.
LAWS ch. 273, §§ 14-15 (1956); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.23 (1959); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 49-2 (1966).
72. See, e.g., Todd v. Todd, 151 Fla. 134, 9 So. 2d 279 (1942); Blades v. Szatai,
151 Md. 644, 135 A. 841 (1927); Sanders v. Sanders, 232 S.C. 625, 103 S.E.2d 281
(1958). But see State v. Barilleau, 128 La. 1033, 55 So. 664 (1911); Home of the
Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965).
73. Pry v. Pry, 225 Ind. 458, 75 N.E.2d 909 (1947); Taylor v. White, 160 N.C.
38, 75 S.E. 941 (1912); Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex.
1965); see State v. Ponthieaux, 232 La. 121, 94 So.2d 3 (1957).
74. Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1965).
75. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-1 (1956).
76. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, §§ 24-25 (1966).
77. ARx. STAT. ANN. § 34-1202 (Supp. 1967) (impotence and bigamy); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 61.041 (Supp. 1968) (impotence, consanguinity, and bigamy); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 40, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1967) (impotence and bigamy); Miss. CODE ANN. §
2735 (1956) (impotence, insanity, consanguinity, and bigamy); Mo. REv. STAT. § 452.010
(1959) (impotence and bigamy); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.01 (Page 1960) (im.
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ample, Tennessee includes bigamy and impotence as grounds for divorce. 8
Mississippi allows divorce for bigamy, insanity, impotence, and consangui-
nity in addition to several other grounds."1
The Rhode Island-Maryland approach to the problems of alimony,
property division, legitimacy, and custody and support of children greatly
simplifies matters by permitting divorce for any reason which renders the
marriage a nullity. To a limited extent this approach eliminates the prob-
lems of vagueness and omission which hamper present annulment legisla-
tion. At the same time the court retains the power to treat annulment ac-
tions differently from divorce actions when such differentiation is consid-
ered necessary or desirable. The Rhode Island-Maryland approach, how-
ever, sacrifices the advantages of annulment as a separate marital remedy.
Annulment does serve a valid function as a separate procedure for ter-
minating the marital relationship. The social stigma attached to divorce
may constitute a significant burden to some. Those who dissolve a short
but unpleasant relationship may feel significantly better if the legal pro-
cedure used reinforces their denial that any significant bond ever existed
with the ex-partner. Moreover, although a civil annulment may not satisfy
Catholic canon law,"0 it may be preferable to some Catholics, because it
is theoretically more consistent with the religious remedy than is divorce.
But if annulment is to have a valid place in modem marriage law, its avail-
ability must be limited to situations where it can be said that the parties
have not entered into a complete marriage relationship. Therefore, annul-
ments should be available only when (1) the basis for terminating the mar-
riage can realistically be said to have prevented the formulation of a valid
legal relationship81 and (2) there has been no actual assumption of the
marital status.2 If so restricted, annulment would serve a clearly defined
function and would be distinct from divorce as a means of terminating the
legal relationship created by a defective marriage. In most cases alimony
potence, bigamy, and fraud); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1271 (1961) (impotence
and fraud); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (1955) (impotence, bigamy, consanguinity,
and fraud); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801 (1955) (impotence and bigamy).
78, TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-801 (1955).
79, MIss. CODE ANN. § 2735 (1956).
80. See J. RISK, MARRIAGE-CONTRACT AND SACRAMENT 108 (1957); Snee, The
Canon Law of Marriage: an Outline, 35 U. DET. L.J. 309, 365 (1958).
81. This would probably include most of the traditional grounds for annulment, but
it would also suggest a more stringent application of some of them, particularly fraud.
82. Mere consummation of the defective marriage would not be "actual assumption
of the marital status." The controlling facts would be whether in the eyes of the com-
munity the parties have assumed the obligations of this status. Material evidence would
include: whether the parties cohabited; length, continuity and openness of any cohabita-
tion; whether the parties became economically interdependent.
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would not be justified and there would seldom be any need for division of
property. Of course, if a child has been born, matters of custody and sup-
port must be determined. Provision should be made for all these matters,
but it should be made clear that discretion to grant alimony and divide
property is to be sparingly exercised. This redefinition of annulment woufa
be impractical in those jurisdictions where annulment serves primarily as
a means of avoiding unrealistic divorce laws. The problem of legislation
which fails to correspond to the desires of the affected populace cannot be
solved by simply attempting to remove those devices used in practice to cir-
cumvent it. But where there is no reason to anticipate use of the statutory
scheme for such purposes, restricted annulment procedures would serve a
valuable function.8 3
83. For a more thorough consideration of the annulment law in a number of states
see Anderson, Annulment of Marriage in Missouri, 21 Mo. L. REv. 119 (1956);
Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their Annulment, 2 MD. L.
Rnv. 211 (1938); Note, The Effect of Void and Voidable Marriages in Arkansas, 10
ARK. L. REv. 188 (1956); Note, Annulment in Florida, 3 FLA. L. Rnv. 339 (1950);
Note, Annulment of Marriages: An Analysis of Indiana Law, 33 IND. L.J. 80 (1957);
Note, Mississippi's Recent Annulment Act, 34 Miss. L.J. 104 (1962); Note, Annulment
Problems in Ohio, 4 W. REs. L. REv. 73 (1952).
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